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Like most Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has adopted a gradual and cautious approach in its
transition to a market economy.1 Although some measure of success has been achieved in attaining short-
term  macroeconomic  stability, 2 microeconomic reforms h ve  lagged behind.  The policy  agenda  for
structural reform remrains  formidable.
An active transformation of Uzbek  state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into shareholding companies
has been underway and private enterprises account for 45 percent of the total number of registered firms
(where the vast majority of private firms are of small and medium scale).  But business decisions to set
prices, output and investment are often not market-based, nor wholly within the purview of businesses,
especially those operating in the commercial manufacturing and services sectors, and this creates market
distortions and misallocattion of resources.  Lines of authority for corporate governance are ill-defined, not
only in ISOEs  and State "'trade associations", but also in privatized firms, engendering weak external and
internal disciplines on  corporate performance, and  little effective  separation between  government and
business.  While  nascent  legal  frameworks  for  both  cDmpetition policy,  governing  firms  in  the
commercial  sector,  and  regulatory policy,  governing  firms  in the  infrastructure  ("utility")  monopoly
sector, have been created, implementation and enforcement have been hampered by the use of old-style
instruments rooled in central planing (e.g., uniform market share monopoly registration, price controls,
etc.),  the  lack  of  a  strong  independent  regulatory  rule-making  authority,  poor  understanding  of
competition and regulatory reforn  concepts, and weak institutional capabilities for analysis of market
structure and business performance.
The experience fiom other transition countries demonstrates that  successfully dealing with these
problemrs are  critical  for  laying the  structural  basis  for  robust  and  enduring  growth.  Uzbekistan's
government is cognizant  of these challenges and  recogni2es that  without effectively  addressing them,
there are pronounced risks that the overall economic reform program could be undermined.  Indeed, one
of the key items on the government's  policy agenda, as part of its comprehensive program of economic
reforms for the period 2000-2005, as outlined in the Cabinet of M:inisters  Resolution No. 296 of June 10,
1999, is to develop new structural reforms that improve Uzbekistan's competitive business environment.
This paper-based  on fieldwork in Uzbekistan-outlines  recommendations for developing such a
structural refonr  program.  Six  main  policy  challenges  are  identified,  and  the  paper  is  organized
according to those challenges:  (i) concepts of competition and regulation in a market economy appear to
be  not  well  understood  both  by  policy-makers  and  market  participants;  (ii)  the  formulation  and
implementation of competition and regulatory policies are poorly linked to the core objectives and design
of the  Government's  overall economic reform  program; (vii) the  Government has developed a  limited
knowledge base and capacity for analysis of the country's industr,ial structure and deterninants  of a more
competitive  business  environment;  (iv)  the  organizational  and  functional  independence  of  the
Government's authority for formulating and enforcing competition and regulatory policies, as well as the
system for  effective checks  and balances to ensure  strong public transparency  and  accountability, are
weak; (v) corporate governance incentives to instill strong competitive discipline on firns'  performance
and  to  engender  effective  separation  between  government  and  business,  especially  in  state  owned
"associations"  and  related  holding  groups  are blunted;  and  (vi)  there  is  substantial  scope  both  for
competitive  restructuring  and  unbundling  of  infrastructure  mronopolies, especially  those  that  are  not
"naturally" monopolistic, and for reform of regulatory oversight cf infrastructure monopoly enterprises to
a strong rules-based regime.
l See Karimov  (1998).
2 See Zettelmeyer  (1998).
3For  a description  of the overaif  reforrn  program  see World  Bank (1999).Because many of the structural  problems found  in Uzbekistan  are common with those  in other
Central Asian republics, the analysis presented and the policy recommendations developed in this paper
are applicable beyond Uzbekistan per se.
Io UJNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTS  OF COMIPETITION  AND REGULATION
Institutional  Framework.  Uzbekistan has made substantial progress since the advent of reform to
develop an institutional framework to  foster the establishment of a competitive  business environment.
While  the  framework  is  still  evolving,  to  date  it  includes,  among  other  measures  and  actions,  the
establishment of the Anti-Monopoly Committee (AMC), which is housed within the Ministry of Finance;
development of program entitled The Concept of State Anti-Monopoly Policy, which formulates the main
objectives of the Government's  competition and regulatory policy; and enactment of several laws, such as
the  laws "On  Competition  and  Restriction  of Monopoly  Activity  in  Commodity Markets",  "On the
Limitation of MonopolistIc Activit",  "On Natural Monopolies", "On Protection of Consumers'  Rigrhts",
and "On  Advertising".
As  articulated  in  the  Concept  of  State  Anti-Moniopoly Policy,  the  central  objectives  of  the
Government's competition and regulatory reform program-implemented  by the AMC-are  to develop
competition  and  entrepreneurship  in  Uzbekistan's  economy;  regulate  the  activities  of  monopoly
enterprises; prevent  abuse  by  firms with  dominant  market positions;  enforce  sanctions  on  firms who
engage in unfair competition; and protect consumer rights.
The  nascent  institutional  framework  and  policy  objectives  are  generally  consistent  with
international practice.  In trying to achieve the objectives, however, Uzbekistan's  authorities face a key
challenge: ensuring that policy officials in all key agencies and ministries (at both the national  and local
levels) as well as market participants-businesses  (including SOEs, the Privatization Investment Funds
(PIFs) and banks), consumers, workers, and the  general public-both  understand the basic concepts of
competition and  regulation, and  are motivated  to  act  in such a  way as to  capitalize  on the  role that
competitive forces can play  in fueling economic prosperity and  growth.  There are several areas where
this challenge is particularly pronounced and where there is a priority for action-in  particular mobilizing
t-aining, pragmatic policy advice and public education about competition and regulation.
Monopoly  Register. One of the primary instruments by which the AMC implements competition
policy is through its Register of Monopoly Enterprises - a policy instrument commnon  to Russia and many
other CIS countries. 4 Uzbek enterprises that are deemed as "dominant"-  defined by statute as generally
having a market share of at least 65 percent, and under certain conditions a market share of at leaLst  35
percent - are listed on AMC's  Register and therefore must declare (register) their prices and profits for
AMC approval.  In addition, registered monopolists, once they agree with their input sellers and c.utput
buyers on volumes, delivery times, and other conditions (as well as prices) must register these transaction
terms  with the AMC along  with their expected profits.  In certain  cases-typically  for  infrastructure
("utility") monopolies-the  AiC  directly determines prices and profits.
As  of  October  1,  1999  there  were  716  enterprises  and  1,924 prodlucts listed  in the  AMVIC's
Monopoly Register,  of which  91  enterprises  and 205  products  were  registered as  monopolies  at the
national  (Republic)  level,  with  the  remaining  (and  vast  majority)  of  monopoly  firms  and  products
registered in the AMC's  14 regional offices.  Table  1 indicates the sectoral distribution of the registered
monopolies.  In Uzbekistan  there  are  approximately  176,800 firms  with  business  licenses,  the  vast
4 A description  of Russia's competition  policy  framework  is contained  in Broadman  (2000).
2majority of which are srnall and medium scale.  Private finns  account for about 45 percent of the total
number of registered businesses.
Table 1: Uzbekistan  Enterprises  Registered  by the  Anti-Monopoly  Committee  as Monopolies
(Republic and Local Levels; as of October 1, 1999)
Sectors  Number  of  Enterprises  Number  of
Products
Bakery,  grain  and  flour  18  40
Coal  mining  5  6
Natural  Gas  4  5
Food  97  551
Light  industry  30  62
Local  industry  11  22
Petrochemicals  8  33
Machinery  30  63
Construction  materials  71  199
Furniture  16  48
Metallurgy  5  9
Services  323  690
Others  80  157
Total  716  1924
Source:  Uzbekistan  Anti-Monopoly  Committee
Price Control vs. Monitoring.  Senior management of the AMC recognizes that reliance on price
and profit control is neitlher an efficient or desirable approach to advance competition in the commercial
sectors, and that the process is creating misallocation of resources in the economy.  Accordingly, as set
out in Ma4jor  Strategic Measures to Improve the Operations of the AMC, the Committee has set a goal to
switch to a system of monitoring by end-2000.  However, neither the AMC nor the business community
has adequate capacity to appreciate fully how to make the transition to a system of monitoring and draw
lessons from international experience in this regard.
Defining  Economic  Market  Boundaries.  More  fundarnentally,  there  appears  to  be  poor
understanding of and confusion about the  basic concepts of competition  needed to  implement such a
system,  such as: definition  of product  and  geographic  market  boundaries (allowing for  economically
meaningful  measures  of  market  share  and  dominance  ralher  than  application  of  statutorily  defined
quantitative formulae that artificially classify firms as monopolies); price  and cross-elasticites to gauge
market  demand and  product  substitutability; marginal and  fixed costs  and  their relationship to  price-
setting and profit maximization; seller and buyer concentration; determinants of barriers to entry and exit;
3  -etc.  The staff of the AMC, with the assistance of international experts, has been undergoing training in
competition issues over the past year, and the AMC has recently developed a Workplan for  Training and
Assistance for the future that, if implemented, could help remedy some of these deficiencies.
Strategic Firms. Another key component of the AMC's  program is development of plans for the
"demonopolization" of certain  sectors and enterprises  in the Uzbekistan  economy.  This is a laudable
objective: the competitive restructuring of many of Uzbekistan's  industries should be a high priority item
on  the  Government's  reform  agenda.  Yet  as  described  in  the  draft  Program  of  Formation  cf  a
Competitive Environment for  2000-2005, tabled with the Cabinet of Ministers in late  1999, the proposed
mechanisms  for  such restructuring  are at  variance with  an approach  based  on  economic  concepts  of
competition.
Twenty-nine  sectors/firms  are  identified  as  candidates  for  demonopolization,  ranging  fiom
champagne and cognac production to backpacks and toilet soap to mayonnaise and various oil products.
It is dubious that some of the  sectors identified would truly  qualify as  strategically important for the
boosting the economy's  competitiveness and worth the government expending its limited resources and
political capital on restructuring.  Moreover,  in some cases,  the  indicated market  shares targeted  for
reduction are unlikely to signal monopoly power; for example, the backpack producer has a 37% ma]rket
share, and the refinery producing diesel fuel and fuel oil has market shares of 20% in the former and 15%
in the latter.  Clearly, implementation of demonopolization is a complex endeavor for any government
and must be done with great care so as to not engender new distortions in the economy.  In this regard,
there is a need  for further articulation of Uzbekistan's  demonopolization  strategy and the mechanisms
used for its implementation.
Competition Legislation. Improvements of the existing legislative framework for competition and
regulatory policy are also needed, and this is recognized by the AMC as a priority area for reform.  The
Committee has identified, with the assistance of international experts, several areas where amendments or
new legislation are needed, including demonopolization in commodity markets, anti-collusion measures,
shareholder and property rights protection, rate-setting for regulated utility monopolies, false advertising,
and  consumer  rights  protection.  In this  context, the  use  of  legislative  concepts  from  international
experience could be extremely useful in legislative drafting.  Equally important, success in passage: and
implementation of any new legislation in this area will be greatly furthered by a deeper understandingl of
such  concepts  by  members  of  the  legislature  and  the  affected  groups-businesses,  workers  and
consumers.  Accordingly outreach and education efforts along these lines should thus be developed.
Public Education and Outreach. More generally, non-governmental  organizations (NGOs) could
play  an important role in public education about the benefits of competition in furthering Uzbekistan's
economic  development.  As  in other  countries, establishment  of independent  non-profit  "competition
education"  foundations,  which  would  be  perceived  by  society  as  non-partisan,  could  leverage  the
Government's  own  public  outreach  efforts.  In  some countries,  such  groups  have  also  taken  on  an
ombudsman  role,  providing  a  very  effective  neutral vehicle  for  airing  consumers'  complaints about
business violations, corruption  and inefficiencies in government programs.  Such  a process  can inl;still
greater  "ownership"  by  the  population  of  market  reforms  and  help  motivate  their  acceptance  and
behavioral change.
m.  LINKING COMPETITION POLICY TO THE STRUCTURAL REFORM PROGRAM
Fostering an improved business environment in Uzbekistan is a core objective of the authorities'
economic reform program.  Yet to date, competition and regulatory policies and the specific goals they
are designed to achieve, have not been fully incorporated within the Government's  broader structural and
4macroeconomic  reform programs;  nor at the same time have the development  and implementation  of
these other reform objectives been adequately informed by the, market-oriented  goals of enhancing
competitive  forces.
Removing Barriers to New Entrants and Restructurm.ng  Incumbents.  In general, the emphasis  of
the existing comrpetition  policy regime has focused on dealing with the regulation  of incumbent  firms.
But  as part of the broader  objectives of encouraging structural reform and  the transition  to  a market
system,  a  greater  orientation  is  needed  towards  generating  growth  through  the  formation  of  new
enterprises, not just  via privatization of existing SOEs, but more importantly, through "greenfield" entry
of new start-ups--both  domestic investors and foreign inveslors.  The experience of many other transition
economies suggests that new entrants, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), are the engines
of growth and job  creation.  In Uzbekistan, recent  surveys suggest that potential new businesses face
substantial administrative and policy barriers to entry, including elaborate licensing requirements at both
the national and local levels; impeded access to foreign exchange; difficulty in arranging for financing
from banks  or other  sources; arbitrary  and burdensome  taxation; difficulties  in  arranging for product
distribution, among others.5 Focusing on developing solutiDns to these problems  as part of the broader
structural reforn  agenda is critical to boosting competition.
E.it of Nonviable  Firms and Hardening Budget Colnstraints.  By the same  token, relatively  little
policy emphasis  has been directed  toward  facilitating  bankruptcy,  including  where necessary,  liquidation,
of insolvent finns in LJzbekistan. The concerns about the potential social costs of such actions is
understandable. Yet, with adequate  social safety nets in place, such costs can be substantially  reduced.
International  experience  can provide  to the Uzbekistan  authorities  important  lessons  about the benefits  of
reducing fiscal and financial subsidies to firms-"hardening  budg;et constraints"-to  engender improved
corporate competitiveness from viable firms and to expose those that are no longer commercially viable.
Indeed,  viewed  frorn  the  broader  structural  reformn perspective,  the  bankruptcy  process  engenders
important benefits: it provides for the re-channeling of productive assets bottled up in inefficient firms to
new ventures where employment can be expanded and new products created.  Importantly, facilitating the
bankruptcy  process  should not be  seen as  simply  in the  purview  of the government;  indeed, on  the
contrary, the main focus  should be on strengthening the legal rights of creditors in Uzbekistan.  In turn
this means accelerating reform of the country's  banking system to one where banks'  credit, lending and
debt collection  decisions  are scrupulously  made on the basis of commercial  and risk criteria. Exacting
such external discipline on the perfornance  of firms in the real sector will go along way to fostering the
competitive restructuring of Uzbekistan's  industry.
Openness to i'nternational Trade and Liberalizationt  of F7oreign  Exchange.  Trade and foreign
exchange  restrictions  in Uzbekistan are pronounced.  They  serve to  shelter noncompetitive  industries
from  market  forces  and  as  a  result  encourage  misallocation  of  resources,  lost  output  and  poor
product'service  quality. Restrictive  trade practices,  such as registration  and prepayment  requirements  for
imports  and  high  averatge import tariffs,  were  enacted  in  1997 and  remain  in  place.  State trading
monopolies  for cotton  and  gold exports, which generate approximately  40% of the  country's  foreign
exchange earnings, also undermine competition within thie economy.  At the same time, the dual
exchange rate system and foreign exchange surrender requitements engender gross structural distortions
in the economy.  Removal of the trade and foreign exchang  - restrictions is widely seen as a precondition
for enhancing thle competitiveness  of the economy and for putting Uzbekistan  on  a path  for enduring
growth.  Indeed, although liberalization of the foreign exchange regime is often seen as a macroeconomic
policy  objective, its  im.pacts on  advancing the  competitilve structure of  the  economy are  as  critical.
Equally  important  accession to the WTO provides an important vehicle to reform  the country's  trade
regime  and  to  lock-in,  under  international  commitments,  the  removal  of  existing  trade  restrictions;
5 LaFleur  (1999);  AMCHAM  Uzbekistan  (1999).
5through the prism of identifying potent reforms to instill competition within the Uzbekistan  economy,
WTO accession should be a clear priority for the Government.
Improving  the Policy Regime for  Foreign Direct Investment  Improving the legal and regulatory
regime  governing  foreign  direct  investment (FDI)  inflows  to  Uzbekistan  should  be  seen  as  another
important policy component of the broader structural reform program to enhance competition within the
country's  industrial base.  FDI  inflows  not only  mean  the transfer  of  financial resources,  but more
importantly usually mean the economy is host to the transfer of advances in technology, the introduction
of  new  products  and  production  processes,  enhancements  in  managerial  and  technical  skills.  and
competitive pressure on domestic firms to perform more efficiently.  Bringing Uzbekistan's  FDI policy
regime in line with international best practice would entail, among other measures that would facilitate
new  entry:  providing  for  non-discriminatory,  "national  treatment"  to  foreign  investors;  phasing  out
existing  trade-related  investment  measures  (e.g.,  local  content  restrictions,  export  performance
requirements and restrictions on use of foreign exchange); freedom for investment-related transfers (e.g.,
profits,  royalties);  binding  international  arbitration  for  investor-State  disputes;  and  international  law
standards for expropriation. 6
Industrial  Policy.  There is also the need for the design of country's  industrial policy program to be
better  informed  by-indeed  be  reconciled  with-the  Government's  emerging  competition  policy
objectives.  While the  latter is to  give emphasis  to greater  use of market forces  in the  economy, the
industrial policy program still bears a heavy administrative imprint and market control.  To illustrate the
problem, Box 1 shows how the draft Program of Formation of a Competitive Environment for 2000-2005
formulates the plan  for the competitive restructuring (or demonopolization) of the cognac sector.  The
plan is striking for its detail as to the seemingly engineered changes in production and market shares for
the various producers in the  sector.  It casts strong doubt about  any significant role envisioned by  its
drafters that market forces will play in the sector's future structure.
Box 1: Restructuring Plan for Joint Stock Company (JSC)  "Khovrenko": Cognac Producer
The current  (1999)  market  share of JSC "Khovrenko"  is 41.3%. The plan is to reduce  the share of the "monopolist"
on domestic  market  down  to 24-26%  by the year  2005 by increasing  the market  shares  of:
>  JSC "Yangiyul"  -from  18%  in the year 2000 up to 20-22%  in the year 2005;
>  JSC  "Shakhrud" -from 20% in 2000  up to 22-24%  in 2005;
P  JV  "Bulungur"  - from 13%  in 2000  up to 15-18% in 2005;
>  JSC  "Urgench  Sharobi"  - from  7% in 2000 up to 8-9%  in 2005.
>  Increase  exports  of JSC "Khovrenko"  from  25% in  2000 up to 30% in  2005.
>  In the year 2005 JSC "Khovrenko"  will be excluded  from the State Registry of Monopolists  since its m,arket
share  will be reduced.
Source: Annex II, Program  of Formation of a Competitive Environment for  2000-2005,  Government  of Uzbekistan;  draft of
October  1999.
6 See Bergsman,  Broadman  and Drebentsov  (1999).
6IV.  ENHANCING  ANALYTICAL  CAPABILITIES
Effective economic policy formulation and implementationi  must be start with high quality and up-
to-date economic infomiation and analysis.  Without a sound knowledge base about an economy's market
structure and the deterninants  of firms'  behavior, it is virtually impossible to design  competition and
regulatory policies that  will have their intended  impacts; in fact under  such circumstances it is quite
possible  that  best  intenitioned reforms  could well  create  deleterious  outcomes  and  worsen  existing
problems.  Moreover,  without  such  informnation,  policy  formnulation  in  other  economic  spheres-for
example, in the area of macroeconomic reform, such as gauging the price and market impacts of foreign
exchange liberalization--will  be made more difficult and subject to errors.
Needfor  More Empirical  Assessments  of Competition.  Although improvements are underway-
in particular within the Center for Economic Research, a quasi-Government think-tank partly funded by
UNDP and TACIS--the  existing database on the structure of Uzbekistan's  industry is still rudimentary.
While  numerous analyses  of  particular  commodity  markets  have  been  undertaken  (as  part  of  the
monopoly registry process) relatively few major empirical studies of the systemic determinants of market
power within key bottleneck sectors of the economy have been carried out.
Cross-Se  ctord  Analysis.  In addition, cross-sectoral analyses that assess structural and behavioral
linkages across industries and markets do not appear to have been undertaken: for example, how  price
distortions, production  inefficiencies  and  bottlenecks in the  inifrastructure monopoly  sectors,  such as
electric power, affect  business performance by  electric power coDnsuming  firms in the tradables  sector,
such as cotton ginning.  Similarly there has been limited analysis of the competitive impacts of existing
horizontal and  vertical  integration, and  the extent  to which  curTent horizontal and  vertical  structures,
especially in the 56  'associations" and holding group structures, engender economies of scale and scope.
Without  this  integrative,  economy-wide  perspective,  the  formulation  of  competition  and  regulatory
policies on  a  "general  equilibrium"  basis  is very  difficult  and  instead forces  policy-makers  to  base
decisions on only a partial view of the determinants of industrial performance in the economy.
Statutory  vs. Economic Definitions  of Markets.  It also appears that the taxonomy of data that are
collected and analyzed is determined more by statutory than economic criteria.  For example, the data are
usually assessed according to the 65%l35%  legal classification of monopolies.  Rather what is needed is
analysis of data to determine the economic boundaries of markets (and thus firms' market shares), based
on questions of procluct substitutability and geographic lim  its of total delivered product costs relative to
demandl.
Influence  of  Market  Structure  on  Corporate Performance.  Equally important, there  is a lack of
analysis of how  convenitional elements of industrial structure, such as seller concentration, barriers to
entry,  ownership structure,  among other  factors,  influence the  competitive  conduct  of firms.  In this
regard it would be important to know on a cross-sectional basis as well as over time, what gives rise to
variations  among  Uzbekistan's  firms  in  terms  of  price-cost  margins  and  rates  of  return;  product
innovation and introduction of new processes; product ancl service quality; access to  and disposition of
domestic financing and earnings; incidence of foreign exchAige; and export performance.
The  AMC and  the  Center  for  Economic  Research  recognize  the  deficiencies  in  the  existing
knowledge base ancl analytical capabilities.  Accordingly they  have  begun to  develop action  plans to
remedy the situation.  Indeed the Center for Economic Research is currently establishing a new thematic
team within the  organization  that  will focus exclusively  on  anialysis of competition  in  the economy.
Clearly, the knowledge-building agenda before the AMC amd  the Center is big, and it will take time to
implement.  Against the backdrop of limited human and financial resources to undertake this effort, it is
important that as the action plans are further refined priorilhies  be set.  The set of issues identified above
7suggests areas for priority attention.  Yet even within those areas, data collection and analysis should be
tailored first toward apparent "worst offenders" and where large amounts of resources in the economy are
potentially at stake.
V.  CREATING A COMPETITION "CHAMPION" WITHIN  GOVERNMENT
The current Anti-Monopoly Committee,  which  was established  by  Presidential  Decree  in May
1996, is  an outgrowth from the  earlier Committee  on  Prices,  which  played  a  central  role  under  the
planned economic system.  This in part explains the AMC's  reliance  on price controls as a competition
policy  instrument.  Although,  as noted  above,  the AMC  has  set itself  the  objective of  moving  to  a
monitoring  type  of  system  in  the  near  future,  the  perception  by  marketplace  participants  of  the
organization's functions as a price (and other transaction terms) control agency will continue to be subject
to inertia from the past.
Organizational  Conflicts  of  Interest.  This problem  is compounded  by  the  fact that  the  Anti-
Monopoly Committee is actually part of the Ministry of Finance, with a Deputy Finance Minister serving
as the AMC chairman.  Housing the organization within the Finance Ministry is, again, an outgrowth of
the AMC's  earlier incarnation  as the  Committee  on Prices.  Other transition  economies'  competition
agencies have had similar early organizational structures.  But effective formulation and enforcement of
competition and regulatory policies requires an agency with a cross-cutting, "honest broker" mandate.  It
also must be seen by all market participants-businesses,  workers, consumers and the general public-as
pursuing  a credible non-partisan  agenda.  In part this  means  operating  independent  of line agencies,
including the Finance Ministry, which, by definition will have an interest in increasing revenues and thus
may create an appearance of a conflict of interest if it has jurisdiction  over competition and regulatory
policy.  For  the  same  conflict-of-interest  reasons,  it  also  means  operating  the  competition  agency
independently of sectoral agencies.  Indeed international experience suggests that effective competition
agencies are those that operate in a de-politicized fashion and have the clout-the  "teeth"-to  deal with
powerful vested interests, not only in the economy, but equally  important on  an inter-agency basis  in
cabinet debates.
Lack of Institutional Resources.  The  organizational  structure of  the AMC is comprised. of a
Republic level headquarters office in Tashkent and 14 local level branch offices located in various regions
of the country.  The total number of AMC staff is 414 persons, of which 55 work at the national level; in
other words the vast majority of AMC officials work in the Committee's branch offices at the local level.
The large allotment of staff in the regions reflects the emphasis of the AMC's  activities at the local level.
For example, in addition to its monopoly registering and price/profit control functions (described earlier),
the AMC is involved in the  promotion of competition in selective  sectors carried out by  the regional
offices in concert with local governments.  This includes, for example, establishing mechanisms to help
ensure that public procurements at the local level are mediated through open and competitive tenders.
The AMC is also involved at the local level in the promotion of specific investment projects in certain
sectors or geographic areas of the country; for example, fostering banks to make credit available to SMEs.
Local Level Focus and Regulatory Capture. To be sure, the focus on strengthening competition at
the local level is key, since that is where most business transactions are carried out.  But by the same
token, in Uzbekistan, as in other transition economies with nascent economic institutions, that is where
the  problem  of  "regulatory  capture"  is often  most  pronounced  and  prevalent:  local  authorities  and
business interests are often co-mingled and there are weak systems for checks and balances.  However, it
appears that AMC practices and interpretation of statutes and regulations is not consistent across regions
and local markets.  Discretion  in enforcement appears to be exercised.  This of course only serves to
exacerbate the capture problem.  Moreover, the role AMC branch offices play in promoting projects at the
8local  level,  especially  involvement  in  fostering  bank  credit  lines, makes  the  agency  vulnerable  to
regulatory capture, to say nothing of the fact that such activities;  undermine the Government's collateral
objective of creating a market-oriented banking sector.  Of course, local government officials themselves
may be in violation of competition statutes-e.g.,  protecting local businesses from entry through delaying
issuance of new licenses; provision of fiscal subsidies to incumrnbent  firms; creating an nonlevel playing
field regarding energy prices charged by local utilities to newcomers,  etc.-and  the AMC has brought
charges in such cases.  But without a strong, independent AMC,  it will be difficult to enforce the  law
effectively at the local level, where the stakes are perhaps highest.
Needfor  an Independent Competition Policy AutAority.  There is a clear need to break from the
past  and reinvigorate the  AMC as an  agency independent from the  Ministry  of Finance, with  a new
mandate and "corporate culture".  There is not a single "best" model that the restructured agency should
aim for.  Diffierent couantries  use  different organizational  set ups.  Among  other schemes,  some have
established a unitary independent agency that combines all competition and regulatory policy functions;
some have  establishecd both  an  independent  competition  policy  agency  as  well  as  an  independent
regulatory agejncy (or  agencies);  and  some have  established  portions of  competition policy functions
within a ministry of justice  as well as other portions in an independent  agency; etc.  But international
practice does suggest a  set of principles upon  which  a revitalized  competition agency should operate.
Such principles would likely include the following elements: (i) competition policy/regulatory decisions
should be rules-based, judgements made  in an impartial, independent fashion, and remedies devised on
the  merits of the  case, in  line with  competition  policy objectives;  (ii)  the entity's  budget  should  be
financially autonomous from other ministries; (iii) the entity headl should have clear lines of authority and
appointed and dismissed by only the Prime Minister, subject to strict, well-defined criteria, and/or serve
for  a  fixed term;  (iv)  there  should be a  transparent  appeals  process  for  consumers  and  businesses,
including public hearings; (v) the agency should have autonomous legislative authority; (vi) the agency's
perfonnance should be subject to regular public monitoring to ensure the public interest is protected; (vii)
regional  offices  should  be  sufficient  in  number  and  breadlth  to  ensure  effective  oversight  and
implementation at sub-republic  level; and (viii) the agency should be staffed with adequate number of
professionals with the requisite skills and technical expertise.
(Clearly,  reorganizing the AMC is a complex  endeavor and will take time.  The task  should be
undertaken  as a  deliberative  process  with  public  discussion,  especially  involving the  major  affected
parties within the country.  The advice of practitioners from other  countries should be sought so as to
learn the lessons of international experience.  Nonetheless, a structure should be established that best suits
Uzbekiistan's own characteristics and challenges.
VI. STRENGTHENING  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  INCENTIVES
A critical component for the improvement of the business environment is the institution of market-
oriented  incentives  for  corporate  governance  practices.  In  LUzbekistan sound  corporate  governance
practices  are  blunted  because  of  ill-defined  corporate  organizational  structures  and  institutions,
contradictory lines of authority, and weak disciplines/checks'ancl balances, especially in the management
of State assets.  Although Uzbekistan has enacted a Company Law, in practice the structure of th  modern
corporation  has  not  yet  been  widely  adopted  in  the  country.  Uzbekistan's  approach  to  corporate
governance-particularly  in  the key  firms, which  still have  heavily  state  involvement-shares  many
similarities with China. Russia and other transition economies.'
7 China's state  asset management  approach  to corporate  governance  is described  in Broadman  (1999) and World
Bank (1  997);  Russia's  post-privatization  corporate  governance  challenges  are described  in Broadman  (1999).
9The Modern Corporate Form. Generically, there are four key attributes of the modem  corporate
form worldwide; see Box 2.  They enable the enterprise to mobilize and  deploy financial and  human
capital and transform inputs into outputs on a large scale efficiently.  The weakness or absence of one or
more  of the  attributes  significantly  impairs  the  corporation's  efficiency.  For  example,  with  limited
transferability of ownership interests, the flexibility of owners to reallocate assets to higher-use values is
blunted.  This would distort the market value of the business, which  indicates how well management is
performing.  Thus, weak transferability would undercut a powerful mechanism that disciplines corporate
management to satisfy owners'  goals of asset value maintenance and increase.
Operating a large modem  corporation inevitably involves the separation of the firm's  ownership
from its  management.  The  owners  select  managers to  run the  firm,  and  in  the process  the  owners
relinquish  some of their  control  as they  delegate  (some)  decision-making  to  managers.  "Corporate
governance" refers to the set of relationships that link the ownership  and control of an enterprise, the
mechanisms through which these relationships are mediated (e.g., monitoring  and evaluation controls),
and the nature of incentives, risks and constraints that affect how the actions of a firm's owners, managers
and workers as well as others (e.g., banks,  suppliers and customers) influence the  firm's  conduct and
performance. 8 The classic problem of the owners is how to structure internally the corporate organization
and its operations in a manner that provides the proper incentives to managers for the attainment of the
owners' goals.  At the same time, various external incentives discipline the conduct of managers and thus
ultimately affect firm performance (see Box 3).  International experience suggests that improved business
performance depends not only on how well a business implements the four key attributes that comprise
the modem corporate form, but also on the dynamic interplay of these internal and external incentives.
Box 2: The Four Structural  Attributes  of the  Modern  Corporation
1.  Separate  identity. The corporation  is a legal entity distinct from its owners ("shareholders"),  with a clear
definition  of and accounting  for its own assets  and liabilities;
2.  Limited liability for owners.  Owners' risk of financial loss is  limited  to their contribution  to the
corporation's  capital;
3.  Centralized  role for corporate  management  and a board of directors.  The day-to-day  affairs of the
corporation  are conducted  by one or more persons  ("managers"),  who are hired by the owners. A boarcl  of
directors, elected by the owners, represents  the owners' interests by giving direction to management  and
carrying  out oversight  of managers'  performance;  and
4.  Transferability  of ownership  shares. The shareholders'  ownership  interests  are transferable,  and a transfer
by an owner  does not, in itself, change  the rights and obligations  of the corporation  with respect to its ciwn
assets  and liabilities.
Source: Broadman (1996)
Principal-Agent Problems.  Providing for sound corporate governance  is a  challenge all modern
corporations the world over must meet.  It is difficult to ensure that the actions of a firm's managers (the
"agents") are consistent with the interests of the firm's owners (the "principals").  When managers do not
act in the interest of owners, "principal-agent problems" arise.  The extent of this conflict dependls on a
number  of factors, most importantly  the extent  and  quality of information  about the activities  of the
managers.  Owners have dealt with the principal-agent problem through  a variety of means including:
increasing the  flow  of information  made  available  by  managers  about  their  activities; more  intense
monitoring  by  owners  and  others  (including  banks)  of  managers'  conduct  and  performance;  and
8 See Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997).
10implementing mechanisms to better align the interests of managers and owners/shareholders (for example
performance contracts, stock options and ownership).  Of course, idifferent  types of corporate governance
systems have been used to solve the principal-agent problem.  For example, the United States and the
United  Kingdonn rely  heavily on  shareholders'  actions in stock markets,  Japan  utilizes  a  bank-based
system and Germany's framework is centered on institutional investors. 9 There is no obvious ranking as
to  which  of these  three,  or  any  other,  corporate  governmnce system  is best  for  promoting  efficient
corporations.  ]3ut there  is  a  clear  consensus  worldwide  that  all  of  the  most  successful  corporate
governance  sysltems are  centered  on the judicious  use  of- market-based  incentives.  The  OECD  has
recently devised a set of corporate governance principles that provide a useful guideline.'0
Box 3: ][nternal  and  External Incentives Determine  Corporate  Performance
There are two categories  of factors  whose dynamic  interplay  dletermine  the performance  of the modem
corporation:  the "internal"  incentive  arrangements  between  owvners  and managers,  and the "external"  factors
that discipline  and monitor  the behavior  of managers and ultimately  the firm's performance.  While internal
incentives  are necessay to achieve  corporate  efficiency,  they are nol sufficient;  external incentives  must also
be manifest.
(a)  Internal Inceeitives. These include the structures  and mechanisms  by which the owners cause the
managers  to act for the goals set by the former,  i.e., the internal  "corporate  governance"  arrangements.
This  involves  defining  how the owners,  the board of directors  and managers  interact  with one another
to fulfill  the oNvners'  objectives. The arrangements  stipulate  how various decisions  will be made and
who will be accountable  for them. The principal  decisions  include owners' election  of the board of
directors,  the naming of corporate  officers,  approval/disapproval  of changes  to the corporate  charter,
mergers/  acquisitions,  increases and decreases  in capital,  major debt borrowings,  disposal of assets,
determination  and deployment  of retained  earnings  and  dividends,  and the setting of managerial  pay.
(b)  External I[ncentives:  These are factors that are not usually under the direct control of owners
(although  they can have some  indirect  influence  on them). They  include the extent  of product  market
competition  (including  the ability  for the fmn to affeci:  market  prices and for new competitors  to enter
and exit the market);  the functioning  of equity and debt markets (including  the effectiveness  of the
"market  for corporate  control"  and  of threats of banknrptcy  or liquidation  for value-subtracting  firms);
the corporation's  legal obligations,  including  monitoring  of financial  accounts  through independent
audits; and the competitiveness  of the labor market (including the  market for managerial and
entrepreneurial  talent).
Source: Broadman  (1996).
Associations.  In Uzbekistan,  as  epitomized  in the  case  of the  56  "trade  associations"-which
dominate  key  sectors--corporate  governance  practices  are,  in  general,  not  fully  based  on  market
incentives.  It appears there is often little distinction between the role of government as policy maker and
regulator, on the one hand, and business shareholder (owner) and manager, on the other.  Formerly sector
ministries, associations were established in 1992-3 by Presidential Decrees, and have  charters approved
by  the Cabinet of Ministers; typically they  are not registered as companies  under  the  Company Law.
Although  the famctions of associations vary  from sector to  sector, they  include  lobbying to  advance
"4members"' interests; rationalizing output, pricing, investmntrt, distribution, input, and foreign exchange
allocation decisions; and operating akin to holding companiies. For three case studies of associations, see
Box 4.  Figure 1 provides an organizational chart of Uzbekneftegaz, the oil and gas association.
9  See  Aoki and Kim (1995).
OECD  (1999).
11Box 4:  State "Associations"  in Uzbekistan
There are 56 "trade  associations"  in Uzbekistan.  Due to consolidation,  the number  of associations  is decreasing;  last year three
construction  associations  were  terminated. The  following  summarizes  case studies  of 3 associations.
Uzavtotrans  (motor transport  services): Uzavtotrans  was created by Presidential  decree in 1993, and was formerly  a sector
ministry; although it officially  bears the name of a "joint stock company",  it is not registered under the Compary Law.
Uzavtotrans  is essentially  an administrative  holding  group overseeing  285 firms,  of which about 215 are either state owned  or
joint state-private  and 70 are wholly  private,  including  one joint-venture;  the number  of firms with  private  shareholding  has been
increasing,  virtually  all in the freight  area.  Uzavtotrans  describes  its role as serving  as "an intermediary  between  the Government
and its member-firms".  The firms  in the association  have  approximately  80,000  employees. Uzavtotrans  has a 60%  market  share
in passenger  transport,  and a 25% market  share in freight  transport. The  head of Uzavtotrans  has the rank of Minister  and he is a
member of the Cabinet of Ministers.  He is elected by the association's "corporation  council"-its  board of which he is
chairman-and his appointment  is approved  by the President  of Uzbekistan.  The corporation  council  has 121  members,  of which
"40 are major shareholders."  Uzavtotrans  does not issue a public  annual  report;  the "minister"  reports regularly  on the sector's
plans and performance  to the Cabinet.  Firms that are members  of Uzavtotrans  officially  pay a membership  fee of 1.5%No  of their
reported  profits. The association's  budget for 1998  was 380 million  Som (US$ 2.75 million).  Uzavtotrans  does not directly  get
involved  in foreign  exchange  transactions  with its members. However,  Uzavtotrans  does directly  assist  their firms in arranging
for bank credits:  in fact it arranges  for State  guarantees  for the loans  and underwrites  the credit  risk.
Uzbeknef  eeaz (petroleum  and gas): Uzbekneftegaz  is a part  of the former  ministry  for oil and gas, which dates  back  to th,e  break
up of the USSR. Created  by a 1992 Presidential  decree,  it has gone through several  re-organizations  in the past seven years;
Uzbekneftegaz  is not registered under the Company  Law.  Its underlying  holdings include 8 directly held entities and 79
indirectly  held entities. All entities  except  for one are reported  to be joint-stock  companies,  with  at least 51% state ownership,  as
exercised  through  Uzbekneftegaz  on the underlying  entities' boards;  the exception  is Uzmal  Oil, which is ajoint venture  between
Uzbekistan  and Malaysia. In total, the firms employ  83,000 persons. In the upper level holding entity itself, there are 127
employees,  and its budget for 1999 is 700 million Som (US$ 5.1 million);  no information  was available  on the fees collected
from its members.  Uzbekneftegaz  is governed  by (i) a supervisory  committee,  which is chaired by the Prime Minister and
includes  other  ministers,  other  state representatives,  including  banks; and (ii) a board of directors, which is comprised  of nine
senior  managers  of Uzbekneftegaz.  The  board reports  to the supervisory  committee.  The head of Uzbekneftegaz  has the rank  of
minister  and is a member  of the Cabinet  of Ministers. Uzbekneftegaz  does not issue a public annual  report;  although  the CEO
does report quarterly  to the Cabinet of Ministers on the association's  plans and performance.  Uzbekneftegaz  oversees and
"controls"  the production,  sales and distribution  of the products and services  of its underlying  entities. For domestic  sales that
Uzbekneftegaz  makes  to the Ministry of Energy, prices are regulated by the Ministry of Finance (i.e., the Anti-MJonopoly
Committee);  for international  sales, the terms are based on negotiated  contracts.  Uzbekneftegaz  manages the earn.gs  and
disposition  of foreign  exchange  for the underlying  entities.  The association  also arranges  and provides guarantees  for credit
extended  by banks to its underlying  entities;  it reports  that it has not  had a problem  in bank loan defaults.
Uzkhlonko  romsbvt  (cotton  processing  and marketing):  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  was established  by Presidential  decree  in 1.992;  it
was  the Ministry  of Cotton  Processing. It is not registered  under  the Company  Law. The CEO has the rank of minister  and is a
member  of the Cabinet of Ministers;  he is appointed  by the Cabinet of Ministers. There are about 130 cotton ginneries  as
members  of Uzkhlopkopromsbyt;  each has 3-4 cotton producers  associated  with them. In total, its member  firms ernm.oy  60-
70,000  persons. All of the ginneries  are reported  to be joint-stock  companies.  For the typical ginnery,  the state owns 51  of the
shares,  employees  own 26%, and individuals  own  the remaining  shares. For the state shares,  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  represents  the
state on the ginneries' boards. There is a plan for state ownership  to decrease  to 25%. Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  reports  that at present
it has two main  objectives:  First,  it provides  credit  to cotton  producers  from a special  fund established  by a Presidential  decree  to
finance the annual  cotton-picking  campaign;  producers pay back the credits  through selling cotton  to Uzkhlopkoprornsbyt  at
predetermined  prices, which may or may not contain a premium compared to world prices.  Second, Uzkhlopkopromsbyt
provides  transport  and storage  services  as well as equipment  and technical  assistance  to ginneries.  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  does not
engage in the export  of cotton;  it only has the rights to sell to domestic  factories (the  Ministry of Foreign  Economic  Relations
handles  cotton  exports).  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  was  unable  to provide  information  on its budget;  the fees it collects  are determined
by the price  premia  paid to ginneries,  which it estimates  as 2% of the price, but it varies across  producers. Membership  in the
association  is not obligatory;  however,  there  are no cotton  producers  that are not in its membership.
Source: Author's  interviews
12Associations are headed by individuals that have the rank of Minister, serve as members of the
Cabinet of Ministers, attend meetings of the Cabinet and regularly report to the Cabinet on the sector's
output, producticin plans, profitability and other indicator's  of perFormance.  Some associations have set
up  their own  banks; most  have not.  Associations are governed  by  "boards  of directors"  (or  similar
groups) comprised of sector 'insiders'.  Staff of an association typically  serve on the  boards of their
underlyiing  entities, representing the  State's interests on the boards'  decisions.  While most association
members are SOEs, some associations have members that are privatized firmns,  new private entrants, and
foreign joint  ventures; however,  it is widely perceived thal: most associations are not in favor of their
members being privatized and that they act to forestall such privatizations.  It is also widely perceived that
associations act to undercut competitively the PIFs; for exanple  by arranging for  subsidized credit  or
energy inputs to create an unlevel playing field.  Although in many cases an association may hold less
than a 25% share in em underlying entity-the  size of share ownership required under the Company Law
to block  shareholders'  decisions-by  dint of the association's  control over other facets of the sector's
operations, it can exercise  control over an entity disproportionately to its ownership.  Managers of the
underlying firms still perceive of the associations as their sector ministries; although the name  of their
supervisory authority has changed, the firms' managers see ro effective change.  While membership in an
association is not legally mandatory, in practice, virtually every firm operating (or seeking to operate)
within a given sector is (or becomes) a member of the sector's association.  Estimates vary as to the size
of membership fees charged, but they appear to be on the order of 1  0%-20% of profit.
Corporate governance incentives and structures appear stronger in the private sector.  In 1999 there
were 84,900 private firms in Uzbekistan; as noted earlier, this accounts for about 45 percent of the total
number of registered firms in the country.  Most of these firns  are of small and medium size; relative few
are corpDrations under the Company Law.  Improvements in corporate governance are most pronounced
in the PIFs.  But  these  entities  are not yet of  sufficient scale  in the  economy to  effect  fundamental
behavioral changes in business practices, nor  induce systemic competition economy-wide.  Indeed the
role of the PIFs appears to be on the decline, in part because of the continued dominance of the trade
associations.
Separating Government from  Business. Enhancing corporate governance practices in Uzbekistan
can conme  about though  several related  reforms.  First,  in  order to  engender real  separation between
government and  business-a  critical  objective for  clarity of corporate  governance  incentives-the  56
"associations"  should  undergo  fundamental  reorganization  and reform.  This would  include  (i)  their
corporatization and becoming  bona fide  commercial  companies--under  the  strictures of the  Company
Law.  In other  transition  economies  where  SOEs have  been  corporatized,  there  has  been  improved
enterprise performance.  At the same time, (ii) the associations should employ 'outsiders'  and non-State,
non-government  representatives  on  their  boards  of  directors  and  in  senior  management  positions,
including  but not limited to,  the  chief  executives.  Heads of  associations would  no  longer  serve as
"ministers", sit on the Cabinet of Ministers, nor have membership in the Government.  And, in time, (iii)
the State should divest of its ownership shares in all but a very select few associations, essentially (a)
those where there are bona fide  natural monopoly structures (see below) and (b) bona fide  military or
national security activities.  If the Government is indeed interested in compelling a stronger competitive
enviromnent for private business development in Uzbekistan, continued State ownership on the scale that
currently exists in the associations will be highly problematic.  At a minimum, the Government will need
to come to the realization that if it is interested in enhancing the use-value of State assets, there is a very
strong case for reducing State ownership to a passive, minority  position and providing for professional
independent managers to serve as custodians and control association enterprise operations.
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Figure  I': Organizational  Chart  of UzbekueftegazSimplifyinA  Holdijng Company/Group  Structures.  Second, simplification,  rationalization  and
competitive  restructuring  of holding  group structures  should also be carried out. In the associations  where
such holding  company-type  structures  exist, they appear (relative  to international  practice)  to be not only
unduly complex  and non-transparent-thus making the task of utilizing internal  control mechanisms  for
effective information gathering/monitoring  of  management and  employee activities difficult-but
arguably  are also not structured  to maximize  economies  of s ale and scope, thus engendering  increased
operational  and production  costs and undermining  competitiveness. Different associations  will require
different types of simplification,  rationalization  and restructuring,  and there is no unifonn model that
should  be implemented.  Carrying  out the two reforms indicated  above  will help  reorient the incentives  to
those who should  be in a better position  than is currently  the case for deciding  what type of restructuring
makes  the best commercial  sense.
Fostering  Competitive  Rivalry.  Third, by the same tokeui,  stronger external competitive
discipline on the associations will also help compel the restructuring that is desirable.  In part,
this means following through with the other reforms suggested in the sections above for
improving the overall competitive environment in Uzbekistan.  This should help encourage new
private business entry and provide for a more fertile environment for PIFs to challenge the
market domain of the associations.  The example set by China of allowing non-state firms to
challenge SOEs is instructive in this regard."  But it also means that other external checks and
balances need to be put in place.  In particular, commercial and risk-based banking and financial
sector practices are required to exert effective credit and debt collection discipline on business
performance.  Similarly, application of international acccunting standards (IAS) and published
regular audits of such financial accounts carried out by irLdependent  auditors will also be
essential.
VITI.  COM[PETlITIVE RESTRUCTURING AND REFOIRM OF INRASTRUCTURE
MONOPOLIES
Like other  Irans  ition  economies,  Uzbekistan  has adopted  the nomenclature  of "natural  monopolies"
for  specific sectors  of  the  economy-those  that  typically encompass large firms  that  provide
infrastructure  services  on a public, economy-wide  basis, i.e., services  that are either basic inputs to other
businesses  or basic provisions  for the livelihood  of households. Rooted in the earlier Soviet  regime, the
designations  of many such monopolies  as "natural" have less to do with the true economic  structure of
markets than with previous notions of command and conitrol  and central planning, as enshrined in
statutory  criteria.
Under Uzbekistan law-for  example, the law "On Competition and Restriction of Monopoly
Activity in  Commodilty  Markets"'-at  least the following sectors are formally defined as "natural
monopolies":  (i) production  of oil, gas condensate  and natural gas; (ii) coal mining;  (iii) pipeline  transport
of oil, refined  petroleum  and  natural gas; (iv) generation,  transmission  and distribution  of electric  power
and heat; (v) railway transport; (vi) port services; (vii) airport services; (viii) telecommunications;  (ix)
postal services;  and (x) water supply and sewage. Table 2 indicates  the number  of "natural mbnopoly"
suppliers  in each sector  as indicated  by the Anti-Monopoly  Committee  as of October 1999.
See Broadman (1999).
15Table 2: Uzbekistan Enterprises Registered as "Natural Monopolies" at the Republic Level
(as of October 1, 1999)
Sectors  with "Natural  Monopolies"  Number  of Enterprises
Production  of oil, gas condensate  and natural  gas  '7
Coal  mining  4
Pipeline  transport  of oil  1
Pipeline  transport  of natural gas  2
Generation,  transmission  and distribution  of electric  power  and heat  48
Railway  transport  I
Airport  services  12
Postal services  16
Telecommunications  21
Water  and sewage  30
Total  142
Source: Uzbekistan Anti-Monopoly Committee
When Monopolies are No  Longer  "Natural".  International experience  shows that policies that
stifle the operation of inherently competitive infrastructure sectors, as well as prevent the progression of
traditional "natural" monopolies into more competitive regimes, impose costs on society in the form of
high  consumer  prices,  poor  production  efficiency  and  retarded  innovation.  Distinguishing  between
competitive versus noncompetitive infrastructure sectors is thus an important  policy issue in designing
further transition reform initiatives.  In this regard,  governments worldwide  typically categorize  public
enterprises into three groups, and this taxonomy provides a useful guide for Uzbekistan policymnakers:  (a)
in "strategic" industries-the  national military defense sector, the currency mint, and the mining of rare
metals that have national defense applications-there  is, with few exceptions, a compelling rationale for
state involvement; (b)  in "monopoly or quasi-monopoly" industries-usually  local-level utilities  in the
energy,  mass  transit  and  communication  sectors-the  rationale  for  government  involvement,  either
through direct  ownership or regulatory oversight  of nonstate-owned  service providers, has historically
been strong inasmuch as market forces alone can often produce suboptimal results; however, such sectors
can evolve to a point where the competitive provision of such services is most efficient, and this outcome
has often entailed the divestiture of utility firmns  to private owners; and (c) in "commercial"  industries-
most  of  the  manufacturing  and  services  sectors-there  is  generally  little  justification  for  state
involvement, as competitive market forces often engender the greatest efficiencies.
The overwhelming  majority  of  industrial  sectors in  countries  around  the  world  today  possess
underlying organizational structures that  are inherently competitive.  Thus within the typical industrial
sector,  maximum  social  efficiency  is realized  when  numerous  firms  are  producing  the  product  (or
service); the output share of each firm is not large enough to control the prevailing price  in the market;
any attempt by a firm to charge an above-market price will produce a loss of consumers or entry by rival
16firms eroding any temporary excess profits; and prolonged losses of poorly performing firms will bring
on a change of management, a buy-out by new owners, exit or liquidation of the firm.  In such "naturally"
competitive sectors, artificially restricting the number of firms or output through government intervention,
such as by establishing policy barriers to entry or exit, burdensome registration or licensing requirements,
or international tariffs and quotas, raises consumer prices, reduces productive efficiency of the fmns, and
stifles innovation.  Society is thus made worse off.
In contrast, there are a limited number of other sectors where society benefits from fewer firms.
These "natural" monopoly (or oligopoly)  sectors have a special chLaracteristic  unique to the product (or
service)  ihey  are producing,  often  due  to  industry-specific technologies:  as production  expands,  the
average cost of producing each additional unit declines.  In sach special situations, it is most efficient to
let one or a few firms produce as much as the market demands; incleed  too many firms all trying to take
advantage of the sector's :inherent  economies of scale will result uneconomic duplication of facilities and
chronic losses. This raises the question: doesn't  allowing only one or a few firms to operate in a market
simply invite thenm  to take advantage of the opportunity to set prices too high?  There are two answers.  In
some cases, the best solut:ion  is to give the firms exclusive market fianchises in return for subjecting their
price-setting or profits to regulation.  In other cases, the cost of entry and exit by rival firms is relatively
low.  As a result, the credible threat posed by potential comp -titors exerts a sufficiently strong discipline
on the incumbent firm (or firms) to keep prices at competitive levels; these are sometimes referred to as
"contestable" markets.
Worldwide, the inherently competitive sectors generally encompass all of manufacturing and many
natural  resource  and  services  industries;  this  includes,  for  example,  chemicals;  steel;  machinery;
automobile production; textiles;  electronics; oil, gas and  coal; and construction.  Some utility service
industries  possess  organizational  structures  that  are  naturally  monopolistic  (or  oligopolistic).
Underground pipeline  distribution of natural  gas at  the city  level to  residential  consumers  is a  good
example; universally, such firms are given market franchises and subjected to regulation.  But economic
history teaches that many industries thought to be natural monopolies actually go through life cycles; as
they mature, technology advances and markets grow, they evolve into competitive sectors.  Whereas long
distance telecommunications or postal services previously were considered "natural"  monopolies, today
they  are inherently competitively  structured.  The airline industry has  also evolved  into a  contestable
sector.  Putting in place government policies that either prevent such an evolution or maintain artificial
monopolies can inflict sizable costs  on  society in termns  of increased prices;  lost output; poor service
quality; and reduced irmovation.
Competitive  Un  bu,ndling and Restructuring.  These lessons  suggest  several  reform  items  for
Uzbekistan.  The first is the need for proactive restructuring and unbundling in state owned infrastructure
market  segments  where  (i)  monopoly  structures  are  not,  or  are  no  longer,  "natural"  and  (ii)  the
(deregulated) private, cornpetitive provision  of utility services with open entry will enhance  economic
welfare.  Sectors where  such reforms are most needed like]y include coal mining, oil  and natural gas
production, telecommunications, electric generation and transmission, railways and other forms of long-
haul transport, airport services, and postal services.  The draft Program of Formation of a Competitive
Environment for  ,2000-2005 recently tabled with the Cabinet-of Ministers too modestly begins to address
some of these objectives.  The sectoral spread covered in the Program is far too narrow.  Moreover, the
Program foresees maintenance of price controls on such sectors, where not only  should there be entry
deregulation but also price deregulation.
Privatization  and  Competitive  Entry.  Second,  tlhere  should  be  plans  developed  for  the
privatization of these  entities, utilizing international best practice transparent  and  competitive case-by-
case privatization techniques with the assistance of independent financial advisors.  The objective should
be to attract new private  strategic investors to enhance the  operational efficiency  of the entities sold.
17However, privatization of these infrastructure monopolies should not  precede the establishment of
effective  competition  policy and regulatory  disciplines  so as to prevent simply  shifting  a public monopoly
to a private  monopoly.
Regulatory  Reform. Third, in the remaining  infrastructure  monopoly  market segments,  reforms  of
regulatory  institutions  and oversight  procedures  are needed to bring Uzbekistan's regulatory regime in
line with international  practice. Indeed this is also an objective on the agenda of the Anti-Monopoly
Committee. Specifically  actions  are needed in this regard along  several  fronts:
*  De-politicization  of tariff-setting,  entry/exit  decisions,  service offerings  and implementation  of
other  regulatory  mechanisms. In part, this will come about through the restructuring  of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee into as independent agency as suggested above.  Use of  independent
regulators  and judges (where  necessary)  is critical  to ensuring  impartiality  of regulatory  decisions.
The term/tenure  of regulatory  officials  should  be made immune  from the political  process/cycle.
*  Reduction  of discretionary  behavior  in implementing  regulations. Achieving  this objective  will
necessitate strengthening the  legislation that  defines the*  rules-based regime and  enforcing
incentives/disincentives  for officials to adopt stricter adherence  to that regime.  Streamlining  the
decision-making  process  will also reduce  opportunities  for discretionary  conduct  by regulators.
- The content of the regulations should ensure that price, output and investment  decisions  by
service suppliers are both in line with costs and pro-competitive,  i.e., that they create a 'level
playing field" among users so as to  not provide for  cross-subsidies  and unfair advantages,
especially  between  SOEs  and private fimns.
*  Safeguards  should be put in place that increase the public transparency  and accountability  of
regulatory  decisions. This can be accomplished  through regular  public hearings  where all affected
interests  can participate,  including  the regulated  entities,  their business  and residential  consumers,
workers  and the general public.  There should also be a transparent  appeals  process for businesses
and consumers  who wish to question  decisions  that have been  undertaken.
VIII. CONCLUSION  AND SUMMARY
The preceding  analysis  suggested  several areas  where Uzbekistan  should  focus its structural  reform
agenda in order to enhance  the country's enabling  environment  for business  development  and growth. It
is clear that a better  understanding  of, and appreciation  for the benefits  of enterprise  competition  and how
it influences  economic  growth are needed among senior policy makers,  businesses  (including  banks and
the privatization  investment  funds (PIFs)),  and consumers. This can be fostered  through  better training of
officials on the concepts of competition  and regulation; use of on-the-ground  policy advisors thai: can
bring to bear international experience in implementing  competition and regulatory reform policies,
including improving  the legislative  framework;  and greater public education  through, for example,  the
creation of non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs) to communicate  the benefits of competition and
possibly  serve  as an ombudsman  for consumer  rights.
Reform  of Uzbekistan's  competition  policy framework  should  be devised  and implemented  wvithin
the broader context of the Government's  goal of strengthening  the overall structural  reform program; it
should also be linked with the country's macroeconomic  policy objectives. Formulation  of policies to
enhance the business environment should focus not  only on fostering the competitive conduct of
incumbent  frms, but also on (i) reducing  barriers  to entry by new firns-usually  the engines of growth
18and employment creation in transition economies and (ii) reducing fiscal and financial system business
subsidies--"hardening  budget  constraints"-and  facilitating  the  restructuring,  reorganization  and
bankruptcy,  including where  necessary liquidation, of inefficient firms so as to re-channel bottled  up
assets to new ventures.  At the same time, the industrial policy regime should be reformed to be made
consistent  with the  objectives of the country's  competition policy.  Similarly, reforms in the areas of
foreign  exchange  liberalization,  international trade  and  direct  investment,  fiscal  and  financial  sector
policy should be informed by, and harmonized with those aimed at improving the competitive business
environment.
The analytical capabilities of Governmental and associated institutions also need to be considerably
enhanced  to  carry  out  on  a  systematic  and  regular  basis  and  in  line  with  international  practice,
independent  economic  assessments  of  Uzbekistan's  industrial  rmiarket  structure  and  determinants  of
enterprise conduct and peiformance.  To date, only a handful Df  majior  analyses of Uzbekistan's  industrial
structure has been undertaken;  and most have been  on a sectoral basis.  Moreover they have generally
focused on the narTow issues of competition as defined by cuiTent statutes, such as legally defined market
shares.  Rather, what is needed to inform effectively Government competition policy-making consistent
with  promoting  Ihe  public  interest  are:  (i)  comprehensive  independent  assessments  of  product  and
geographic  market  boun(laries, as  determined by  economic  forces  so  as to  accurately gauge  market
structures; (ii) analysis of how the structure of markets (e.g., extent of producer concentration and barrier
to entry) influences business performance and economic welfare; and a focus on not only specific sectors
but also on cross-sectoral market structures, such as horizontal and vertical integration.
In order to create a credible competition "champion"-one  with teeth-within  the Government, the
organizat3ion,  structure and functions of the existing authority responsible for competition and regulatory
policy-making and eniForcement  should be transformed into an independent agency, reporting directly to
the Prime Minister.  The current Anti-Monopoly Committee is an outgrowth from the earlier Committee
on Prices  (hence its reliance  on price controls  as a  competition policy instrument),  and is part of the
Ministry of Finance, with a Deputy Finance Minister serving as its Chairman.  To effect greater public
commitment to  implemernt competition policy  in a de-politicized fashion, reduce  apparent conflicts  of
interest, and have, the  clout to deal with powerful vested interests, both on  an inter-agency  basis  and
within the economy at the republic and local levels, there is a need to break from the past and reinvigorate
the agency with a new mandate and "corporate culture".  There is a not a single model for restructuring of
the agency, but international practice suggests a set of principles upon which the agency should operate,
including, but nolt limited to: decisions should be rules-based; the entity's  budget should be financially
autonomcus  from. other  ministries; there  should be  a  transparent  appeals  process  for  consumers  and
businesses, includling  public hearings; the agency should have autonomous legislative authority; and the
agency's  performance  should  be subject to regular  public monitoring  to  ensure the  public interest  is
protected.
Corporate governance incentives and institutions should be strengthened and brought in line with
market-based principles and  international practice (for example,  the new OECD corporate governance
guidelines) to engender greater transparency and accountability.  Currently, sound corporate governance
practices are blunted because of ill-defined organizational structures and institutions, contradictory lines
of authority, and weak disciplines/checks and balances, especially in the management of State assets.  As
epitomized in the case of the 56 "trade associations", it appears there is often little distinction between the
role of government as policy maker and regulator, on the one hand, and business shareholder (owner) and
manager, on the other: as former sector ministries, these holding group entities bear little resemblance to
bona fide, companies,  are still  headed by  individuals  that  serve on the  Cabinet  of Ministers,  and  are
governed by boards of directors comprised of 'insiders'.  Coiporate governance incentives and structures
appear stronger in the nascent private sector, especially the PIFs, but these entities are not yet of sufficient
competitive scale in the economy to effect fundamental behavioral changes; indeed the role of the PIFs
19appears  to  be  on  the  decline,  despite  the  growing  private  sector.  Generally,  enhanced  corporate
governance  could  be  brought  about  through  (i)  corporatization  (under  the  company  law),
privatization/divestiture  and  competitive  restructuring  of  "associations"  in  order  to  engender  real
separation of government from business; (ii) use of outsiders and non-state representatives  on boards of
directors and senior management; (iii) commercial and risk-based banking and financial sector practices
that  exert  effective  credit  discipline  on  business  performance;  and  (iv)  application  of  international
accounting  standards  and  published  regular  audits of  financial  accounts  carried  out  by  independent
auditors.
Finally, infrastructure monopolies should be subject to systemic restructuring and unbundl]ing  in
market segments where monopoly structures are not, or are no  longer, "natural"  and the (deregulated)
private, competitive  provision  of utility  services with open  entry enhances  economic welfare.  In the
remaining  infrastructure monopoly  market  segments,  reform  of regulatory  institutions  and  oversight
procedures is needed to de-politicize tariff  setting and  implementation of other regulatory mechanisms;
ensure that price, output and investment decisions by service suppliers are pro-competitive (i.e., create a
"level playing field" among users); and increase public transparency and accountability.  The plethora of
so-called "natural monopolies" in Uzbekistan stems less from application of economic criteria than of old
style  statutory designations; with the  development  and  expansion  of markets,  as well  as advances  in
technologies,  increasing types  of utility  services, such as telecommunications  and  electric  generation
(among  others), when  provided through  competitive  multiple  suppliers,  rather  than  protected  single
suppliers, offer the best chances for cost-based prices, high service quality and reliability, and innovation.
In most utility segments, then, the bias should shift towards  regulation by market forces rather lthan by
administrative  means;  however,  privatization  of  infrastructure  monopolies  should  not  precede
establishment of effective competition policy and regulatory disciplines so as to prevent simply shifting a
public  monopoly  to  a  private  monopoly.  Reform  of  regulatory  mechanisms  should  be  keyed  to
strengthening and streamlining the rules-based framework; enhancing safeguards to ensure that decisions
regarding rate-making and  service offerings are impartial and independent;  providing for the tenure of
regulatory officials to be immune from the political process; establishing a transparent appeals process for
consumers and businesses, including public hearings.
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